The aim of this paper is to discuss the process of regional convergence within the framework of an overlapping generations model in which the engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital. In particular, we consider di erent education funding systems and compare their performance in terms of growth rates and pace of convergence between two heterogeneous regions. The analysis suggests that the choice of a particular education system incorporates a possible trade-o between long run growth rate and short run convergence. In such c hoice, the initial capital stock and the extent of regional human capital discrepancy appear as central variables.
Introduction
Perfect capital mobility is a powerful engine to enforce convergence across countries or regions Buiter and Kletzer, 1993 . However, when there is an immobile region-speci c state variable, like land Mountford, 1995 or human capital Buiter and Kletzer, 1995, there is room for at least temporary discrepancies between regions. In the case of human capital, these discrepancies should obviously be a ected by the way education is nanced. The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of di erent education funding systems on growth and on the convergence process of two regions characterized by initial disparities in the levels human capital.
The issue of convergence between di erent and possibly interdependent economies is central in growth theory see, for instance Durlauf and Quah 1998 . More and more attention is nevertheless devoted to regional frameworks see, for example, Sala-I-Martin 1996 which might bedistinguished from international ones by the fact that the economies under consideration share some common institutions. These can of course correspond to an integrated capital or labor market see, for instance, Crettez, Michel and Vidal 1998 but it could also refer to federal levels of decision or legislation. In such a case, we can expect the distribution of competence between geographically di erentiated levels of public jurisdiction to a ect the characteristics of the regional convergence process.
In this paper, we examine these issues within the framework of an overlapping generations model featuring endogenous growth engined by the accumulation of human capital. We consider two regions sharing a common capital market and a federal government. Three di erent types of education funding are then examined. The rst one is a system under which a local authority nances the education of its region by means of locally collected taxes. In the second one, a federal government levies nation-wide taxes to nance education in both regions which possibly organizes cross-regional transfers. Finally, in the market funding system, individuals borrow to nance their education. In both public sector models, the tax rate is endogenized by implicitly assuming this choice to emerge from a voting process. In addition, these three settings are compared to the solution that would obtain under the assumption of a social planner taking into account the di erent externalities contained in the models.
Our question is very close to that examined in several papers related to the interplay between growth and agent's heterogeneity which, very often, illustrate the case of education nance see, for instance Benabou 1996 or Glomm and Ravikumar 1992. Our analysis rst di ers from theirs' as we i n vestigate the properties of a market funding system. Then, the way we treat the spill-over that a ects the human capital accumulation process departs from the standard speci cation. We indeed explicitly incorporate the possibility that the extent of such spill-over might be a ected by the distance between regions see Chua 1993 . From this point of view, distance should be interpreted as any obstacle, whether physical or institutional, that prevent the non-market interactions between agents contacts, exchange of information, face-to-face communication. Economic geography indeed considers these interactions as an important factor in the process of technology or knowledge di usion see, for instance, the extensive survey by Fujita and Thisse 1997. In our framework, the extent by which one region bene ts from the others' human capital is a ected by a transaction cost which re ects the role of distance in the process of human capital spill-over.
As we show in the paper, this assumption leaves an explicit role to the "technological externality" and to the characteristics of the human capital transmission mechanisms which, together with the classical "pecuniary externality" related to the scal spill-over, enriches the description of the regional convergence process. In particular, even under the assumption of constant return to scale, the di erent education systems lead regions to converge in levels. Absent this technological externality, and in coherence with previous analysis Benabou 1996 or Glomm and Ravikumar 1992 , only the federal funding system ensures regional convergence.
The results of this analysis can besummarized as follows: i nation-wide nancing of education proves to foster regional convergence. In terms of the speed at with which regional disparities are reduced in time, the models rank according to the order private, federal and regional system, ii the growth rate obtained in the long run, i.e. when convergence is achieved, is the highest lowest under the market funding system provided that the degree of altruism is low high enough and iii when compared to the social planner solution, the performance of a particular system is critically in uenced both by the initial capital stock and by the extent of regional human capital discrepancy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the di erent systems. Section 3 solves the models for the growth rates and speed of convergence and ranks the di erent systems according to their performance in these two dimensions. Section 4 is devoted to the comparison of the solution obtained under the systems with that of the social planner. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The model
The model is an extension of the overlapping generations model of Allais 1947 and Diamond 1965 in which endogenous growth is made possible through human capital accumulation at the regional level. Time is discrete and goes from 0 to +1. The economy i s composed of two regions, A and B. In each period, each region is populated by three generations, living for three periods. The growth rate of the population is zero and the size of the population in each region is normalized to one. When young, the representative agent bene ts from education spending and builds his human capital stock; his consumption is included in his parents' consumption. When adult, he works, consumes and invests a part of his income in capital which is rented and used by the rms in the next period. When old, he therefore receives the return from his savings, consumes and dies. At each date a single physical goodis produced. This goodcan either beconsumed by the middle-aged and old generations during the period or accumulated as capital for future production. Production occurs through a constant returns to scale technology using capital and labor. Capital is perfectly mobile across regions while labor is immobile.
The production function of the representative rm in region i is given by Y i;t = K i;t L 1, i;t 0 1 where K i;t and L i;t are capital and labor inputs respectively. Note the L i;t corresponds to e ective labor as it accounts for the quantity of human capital used by the rm rather than a n umberof workers. This last e ect introduces convergence forces in the model. The importance of this spillover in the human capital accumulation process is parameterized by which captures the fact that the transmission of knowledge from one region to the other is a ected by distance.
1
As already mentioned, we implicitly assume that knowledge spill-over hinges in part on non-market interactions and social contacts between agents and that its quality in turn depends on the proximity of agents. Note that distance is to be interpreted in a broad sense as it may re ect some physical geographic distance, level of communication technologies, etc... as well as institutional like those introducing some kind of segregation barriers to contacts and therefore to the transmission of knowledge. The restriction 6 1 models an iceberg type transport cost re ecting the idea that a fraction only of one region's human capital reaches or a ects the other region. The function 2 is homogeneous of degree 1 and is thus at the root of endogenous growth in the model. Finally, the clearing condition on the labor market implies in each region L i;t = h i;t 3 2.1 De nition of the equilibrium
We n o w de ne the three di erent equilibria corresponding to the three types of education funding. We assume that, when young agents can borrow on nancial markets to nance their education, the parents do not intervene in this process. On the contrary, when human capital cannot be a collateral for borrowing, there is an ad-hoc altruism factor in opposition to rational altruism as in Barro 1974 and parents vote for public funding. The di erent regimes are thus clearly exclusive as hybrid funding is not allowed.
Regional funding
The utility function of the representative household is logarithmic and depends on consumption when adult c i;t , consumption when old d i;t+1 and on the amount spent on children education e i;t . This last element re ects the ad-hoc altruism factor which is referred in the literature as joy-of-giving" or warm glow, because parents have a taste for giving see e.g. Andreoni 1989 . The adults supply inelastically one unit of labor and earn w t h i;t , where w t is the wage per unit of human capital and h i;t is the level of human capital. This income is allocated to consumption, taxes and savings s i;t for future consumption.
When old, agents spend all their saving and accrued interest on consumption. Notice that households take their own human capital as given; we thus implicitly assume that children are not allowed to borrow on capital markets to complete the amount given by the government. As a consequence, regional education funding only rests on the regions resources.
A local government collects taxes on a regional tax base in order to nance local education spending. Education spending thus di er across regions. Taxes results from a voting process in each region.
The clearing condition on the federal capital market implies that capital of the next period is built from the savings of the adults. In each region the clearing condition on the labor market implies that the labor demand is equal to the labor supply, i.e. the existing stock of human capital.
Notice that the regional funding system is completely equivalent to a system under which parents devote part of their resources to nance the education of their own children. Indeed, if parents can choose the regional tax rate, they manage to devote the same amount of resource to education delivered by a local government compared to the case in which they directly provide education. This result obtains because, in our framework, agents are homogenous in each region and the labor supply is absent, so that taxes are non-distortionary see, for instance, Vidal 1998 who elaborates on this possibility.
De nition 1 regional funding Given the set of initial conditions fK i;0 ; h i;0 g, a n equilibrium with regional funding is a set of sequences fK i;t+1 ; L i;t ; w i;t ; h i;t+1 ; s i;t ; c i;t ; d i;t+1 ; R t ; e i;t ; i;t g i=A;B: t 0 such that In each region, the representative household chooses his savings s i;t according to s i;t = arg max fln c i;t + ln d i;t+1 + ln e i;t g 4 s.t. c i;t + s i;t = w i;t h i;t 1 , i;t 5 R t+1 s i;t = d i;t+1 6 The preferred regional tax rate i;t maximizes the regional indirect utility given the local government budget constraint i;t = arg max flnw i;t h i;t 1 , i;t + lne i;t g 7 s.t. e i;t = i;t w i;t h i;t
In each region, the representative rm chooses capital and labor inputs K i;t ,L i;t according to 1. The human capital accumulates according to equation 2. The equilibrium condition on the labor markets 3 holds. The clearing condition on the federal capital market implies equation:
Federal funding
Under the federal funding system, a federal government levies taxes on a nation-wide basis and uses taxes revenues to nance education spending in both regions. The common tax rate is determined by means of majority voting 2 and tax revenues are equally shared between the two regions to nance education. Taxes are levied on the adults income, disposable income being spent on consumption and savings which, together with the accruing interests, nance consumption when old. As in the regional system, preferences of agents are de ned on adult and old consumption as well as on the level of education delivered by the government to their o spring.
De nition 2 federal funding Given the set of initial conditions fK i;0 ; h i;0 g, a n equi- This version of the model is an extension of Michel 1993 and de la Croix 1996 to an economy with two regions. Under the market funding system, agents nance their education by borrowing on the federal capital market and do not rely on public resources. We therefore assume that individuals have a perfect access to capital market and can use their human capital as collateral to nance their education spending. This implies that the source of education funding is nation-wide and that human capital directly competes with the physical capital formation in the process of resources allocation. One important di erence with the preceding system is that education spending no longer rests on gift motives but on the return that is expected from education under the form of the wage rate associated to a particular level of human capital. We assume that agents borrow and spend on education while young, use the accumulated human capital and retrieve the bene ts from this investment while adults. At this stage, they either consume or save their income. Savings and accrued interests are completely consumed while old. The representative agent's utility is therefore de ned on his adult and old consumption respectively, c i;t and d i;t+1 3 . The rest is identical to the preceding system. The dynamics arising under the di erent funding systems will now be analyzed in terms of three stationary variables: the capital-labor ratio k t , the ratio of workers' consumption in region B to workers' consumption in region A, z t = c B;t c A;t ;
and the growth factor in one region, say A, g A;t = h a;t =h a;t,1 . The interest of using z t = c B;t =c A;t is that, for our di erent decentralized regimes, z t will also measure the ratio of regional human capital h B;t =h A;t .
The objective is to compare the steady growth rates of each system and the speed of regional convergence. An approximation of the speed of regional convergence near the 
Regional funding
Under the regional funding system, the optimal regional tax rate from 7 is i;t = 1 + + The rst order necessary conditions of the household program with regional funding 4 are: s i;t = 1 + + w t h i;t 21 e i;t = 1 + + w t h i;t 22
The equilibrium is described by equations 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 18, 19, 21 and 22 . This set of equations can be reduced to a system of two non-linear di erence equations of the rst order, describing the dynamics of the capital-labor ratio k t and of the ratio z t .
As shown in the appendix, this system admits a unique steady state balanced growth path which is stable. If there is knowledge spill-over 0, the ratio z t converges to 1; In this setting, saving is proportional to disposable income. In coherence with a federal education system, public resources devoted to education are equally distributed among the two regions. As a consequence, regional education level hinges on the federal stock o f human capital which is the classical scal externality fostering convergence among regions see, for instance, Benabou 1996. Under the logarithmic utility function, the optimal tax rate is common to all agents which makes the voting process on this decision trivial and re ects their preferences. The equilibrium is then described by equations 2, 3, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25 and 26 . Reducing these equations to a system of two non-linear di erence equations of the rst order, we can describe the dynamics of the capital-labor ratio k t and of the ratio z t .
This system admits a unique steady state balanced growth path which is stable, the ratio z t converges to 1 and the speed of convergence in the federal funding system is v ff = 2 + 1 , We now compare the properties of the di erent regimes and present the key elements in a series of propositions.
Proposition 1 absolute convergence Assume that the initial levels of human capital di er across regions. Under the regional and market funding systems, there is absolute convergence of these levels if and only if is strictly positive, i.e. if there a r e inter-regional knowledge spill-over. Moreover, in all three systems, the speed of convergence increases with the extent of knowledge spill-over. This proposition emphasizes the role played by the knowledge spill-over in the regional convergence process. The federal funding system is indeed the only regime to display convergence if this type of externality is inoperative as it also features the classical scal inter-regional spill-over. This means that a market funding system, even though it allows one region to access global resources, still does not per se implies convergence between regions. 4 Importantly, note that this result would hold in a standard framework in which the human capital accumulation process of a region also hinges on a global human capital index see, for instance, Benabou 1996 5 . While this also intend to capture the possibility of non-market spill-over, their introduction in such form leaves the regional convergence process unchanged.
Finally, the extent of knowledge spill-over has the expected e ect of fostering regional convergence. Under the interpretation that we gave above in which it depends on the proximity of communities, this framework underlines the central role that any i n tegration mechanism facilitating contacts and knowledge transmission between communities can play i n t h e relative regional developments.
Proposition 2 speed of convergence Assume that is strictly positive. The equilibrium with federal funding displays a higher convergence s p eed than the equilibrium with market funding which itself has a higher convergence speed than the equilibrium with regional funding.
Proof. By inspection of the expressions displayed above for the di erent systems' speed of convergence, the ranking v ff v mf v rf always holds for 6 1.
The federal funding system ensures the most rapid regional convergence since it features both the classical scal and knowledge spill-over. Intuitively, the market funding system implies faster convergence than the regional funding system because under, the former, regional education can be nanced on the global capital market and both regions have access to the nation's resources. From this point of view, we can state that this funding system incorporates some kind of nancial spill-over which, let alone i.e. without knowledge spill-over is nevertheless unable to produce regional convergence. These results are illustrated in gure 1. Notice that when = 1, the human capital spill-over is the same in both regions, and the convergence speed in the market funding and federal funding regime is in nite.
Proposition 3 long-run growth rate For strictly positive, the equilibrium with federal funding has the same long-run growth rate than the equilibrium with regional funding. Proof. By inspection of the expressions displayed above g rf = g ff .
In the long run, provided there is knowledge spill-over, both regions converge proposition 1. This implies that the scal spill-over incorporated in the federal funding system do no longer transfer resources from one region to the other so that it becomes equivalent to the regional funding system. Lemma 1 Altruism and growth When altruism is zero, the growth factor under regional funding or federal funding is zero. This growth factor is a positive function of regional altruism for low levels of altruism. There is a threshold, , above which an increase in altruism has a negative e ect on growth.
Proof. Growth depends on the combination of both physical and human capital accumulation. Also, as education absorbs part of the existing resources, there is a trade-o between human and physical capital. Under the regional and federal funding systems, the parents preferences for their o spring education drives the human capital accumulation process and we therefore have a critical degree of altruism that yields the growth maximizing combination of physical and human capital see also Michel and Vidal 1998 for a similar result in a framework where regions di er in the extent of parental altruism. Proposition 5 Low altruism If the degree of altruism is low enough, the equilibrium with market funding has a higher long-run growth rate.
Proof. By Lemma 1 we have, when = 0 , g mf g pf = g ff = 0 . By proposition 4, we have, when = ? , g rf = g ff g mf . As the growth rates are continuous functions of , there exists a 2 0; ? such that g rf = g ff = g mf . If 6 then g rf = g ff 6 g mf .
As an illustration, gure 2 plots the long run growth rates obtained under the respective regimes for di erent v alues of .
In the regional and federal funding systems, it is the extent of parental altruism towards their o spring which determines the level of education in each period while, in the market funding system, this decision completely relies on market forces. Consequently, if the growth rate obtained under the latter can be reached under the regional or federal funding system, it is for su ciently high education levels or equivalently su ciently high degree of altruism.
4 Choosing the right funding system All the equilibria described above are necessarily sub-optimal as the knowledge spill-over are not internalized by the individual agents. The question of the choice of the best regime is a typical question of nding the second-best policy. We shall address this question by explicitly distinguishing between long term issues and short-run e ects linked to the initial conditions.
Long run issues
As far as long run growth rate is concerned it is useful to compare these equilibria with a rst-best benchmark case which is given by the solution to the planning problem. We are particularly interested in comparing the long-run growth rate of the di erent systems with the optimal growth rate.
The planner maximizes the discounted sum of the utility of all future generations and allocates output between four types of activities: adult consumption, old consumption, investment in physical capital and spending on education. In the planner's problem, education do not depend on parents altruism since the planner takes into account all generations' welfare.
De nition 4 planner's solution Given the set of initial conditions fK i;0 ; h i;0 g, the planner's solution is a set of sequences fK i;t+1 ; L i;t ; h i;t+1 ; c i;t ; d i;t ; e i;t g i=A;B; t 0 such that the planner allocates resources according to Extensive simulation exercises show that the form of the surfaces is robust to alternative parameter values. Let us rst consider the e ect of the degree of altruism . We retrieve the results of proposition 5: if this degree is low resp. high, parents will vote for low resp. high taxes in the regional and federal funding cases, while market funding will be characterized by a higher resp. lower growth rate. Comparing the outcome of the regional or federal funding systems with the planner preferred growth rate, we observe that, except for very small value of and high value of , the planner solution displays higher growth rates. Indeed, as joy-of-giving altruism is ad-hoc, there is no reason for it to take care of the externality and to lead to the planner's outcome.
Turning to the role of the social planner time preference, we rst note that if is very low, the planner mainly cares about current generations in which case g ? is close to zero, implying that the economy disappears after one period remember that g is a growth
factor. For higher values of the time horizon of the social planner is far enough so that the planner's solution yields higher rates of human capital accumulation to guarantee high welfare levels to future generations. For high enough, the planner's growth rate exceeds that of the decentralized systems. In particular, the too low growth rate of market funding results from the presence of the positive human capital externalities that are not taken into account by agents in their decision. From a long-run perspective, this would justify the adoption by a benevolent planner of the system yielding the highest growth rate.
E ects linked to the initial conditions
The initial conditions are important i n c hoosing the best system. Initial conditions include the economy-wide capital stock and the dispersion of human capital. We analyze their e ect in turn.
The initial capital stock: When we consider the expressions for the growth rates in the di erent regimes, we observe that the capital stock has quite di erent e ects in the market funding case than in the two other cases. Indeed, the regional growth rate in the market funding case are proportional to =1 , l n k t while they are proportional to ln k t in the two other funding regimes. As a consequence, the growth rates in the rst periods are more sensitive to the initial capital stock when market funding prevails. Intuitively, if the initial stock of capital is very low, interest rates are very high, and it is very expensive to borrow in order to nance the education spending. Hence, even if market funding was preferred for long-run reasons, this system can bevery costly in the adjustment period if the initial capital stock i s l o w. In the opposite, if the stock of capital is very high and interest rates very low, market funding is advantageous, at least in the short-run.
The initial dispersion of human capital: Given the concavity of agents' preferences, we h a ve seen that the utilitarian social planner promotes homogeneous distribution of consumption across regions. From this point of view alone, one would therefore systematically select the funding system which ensures the highest speed of convergence. On the other hand, the social planner also cares about the long run growth rates reached under the di erent systems.
Accordingly, since from Proposition 3, the federal and regional funding systems lead to the same long run growth rate, the former should always be preferred to the latter because it ensures more rapid convergence. On the contrary, a trade-o between growth in the long run and convergence in the short run might emerge between the federal and the market funding systems provided that the long run growth rate proves higher under the latter remember that, according to Proposition 2, the federal funding system features a higher convergence speed that the market funding system. It is therefore for the choice between these two regimes that the initial conditions concerning the distribution of human capital will play a role. One easily checks that the larger j z 0 , 1 j, the more the federal systems dominates the market system from the planner's point of view as its preference for a fast convergence system increases with the extent of regional disparities.
Regimes speci c technological externalities
Until now, the technological externality was considered as given and common to all regimes. It would nevertheless be reasonable to think that it is not systematically the case. Since the di usion of human capital across regions is assumed to bebased on social contacts, we should consider the possibility that their quality or frequency in fact depend on the institutional environment. In particular, the conjecture that the extent of inter-communities contacts is higher under a federal than under a regional funding system seems plausible part of the technological spill-over is due to the fact that communities share some common institutions like, for instance, a federal ministry of education, which amounts to assume F F RF .
The interest of this case lies in that it also embodies a potential trade-o between long run growth and short run convergence. Suppose that instead of having a social planner who decides on the adoption of a particular regime, this choice is in fact the result of a voting process in which both regions express their preferences. In the case where F F = RF , no consensus can be reached since the region with higher resp. lower human capital endowment would always prefer the regional resp. federal system as the one that ensures the highest level of human capital in subsequent periods for that region.
On the contrary, i f F F RF , from the expressions of the regimes' growth rates, then g F F g RF . Consequently, the initially high human capital region might face a trade o between higher human capital levels in the short run if it selects the regional funding system and higher long run growth rate if it selects the federal funding system. A consensus could be obtained if the richer region prefers the federal funding system which is more likely if the initial human capital discrepancy j z 0 , 1 j is low and if regional decision makers care about future generations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the issue of regional convergence within the framework of an overlapping generations model where growth is related to the accumulation of human capital. We considered the possibility of an initial discrepancy in terms of the regional stock o f h uman capital. Moreover, regions share a common and integrated capital market implying a perfect mobility o f p h ysical capital which is known as an important convergence force.
One important assumption of the model was to suppose that the extent of the human capital spill-over, by which one region bene ts from the other region human capital, depends on the distance between regions. Accordingly, the impact on the regional accumulation process of the other region's human capital stock was formalized as being tempered by something similar to an iceberg transport costs.
We then considered di erent education funding systems and compared their performance in terms of the long run growth rates and pace of convergence between regions. One system, namely the one referred to as the market funding in which individuals borrow on the whole capital market, is rarely examined in the existing literature see, for instance, Benabou 1996 or Glomm and Ravikumar 1992. The analysis rst suggests that a nation wide source of funding, either under the form of a market funding system or of a federal government which redistributes tax levies between regions federal funding system, enhances the regional convergence process compared to the case in which regions rely on their own resources to nance education regional funding system. From a long run growth rate perspective, the federal and regional systems proved to yield the same outcome while the market system was shown to generate di erent growth rates.
Second, from a social planner point of view and abstracting from political economy considerations, the regional funding system case will never be chosen it features the same growth rate as the federal system but also slower convergence.
It is optimal to chose market funding system for ever if the following three conditions are met: i altruism is low, ii the initial dispersion of capital is low and iii the initial capital stock is high.
If the initial capital is high but altruism is strong enough, one might chose market funding system temporarily, then switch to the federal funding system. 6 If both altruism and initial capital are low, one might c hoose the federal system temporarily, then switch to market when interest rates become low enough.
As a consequence the choice of a particular education system was shown to incorporate a possible trade-o between long run growth rate and short run convergence. In such case, it was shown that the choice of a particular system was in uenced by the initial capital stock for a given initial regional discrepancy.
